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Whilst much high-level policy debate focuses on the need to improve theaffordability of housing through supply, this chapter examines changes in
the way in which households on lower incomes or who experience loss of income
are assisted by the state. The benefit cap, originally introduced in 2013 was
lowered in November 2016, and we now have data to assess its impact across the
country. Meanwhile as universal credit continues its roll-out, the chapter looks
‘under the bonnet’ at the detailed effect of some of its provisions. Finally, we
consider how the scheme of assistance to homeowners for their mortgage interest
costs has changed from cash payments to a loan system. 
Benefit cap
The benefit cap was announced in 2010 by the then Chancellor George Osborne 
as part of the coalition government’s programme of welfare reform, aimed at
reducing the budget deficit. It was introduced in April 2013 but lowered from 
7 November 2016 (see Table 2.6.1). 
The cap applies to the benefit income of working-age claimants, their partner and
children who are within the claim. The cap does not apply to universal credit (UC)
claimants if they have earnings equivalent to 16 hours per week at the minimum
wage over the whole month; they have a disability or health condition that
exempts them from all the work-related requirements; or if they care for someone
with a severe disability. As a general rule all income is calculated for the cap, even
where benefits are reduced for deductions (e.g. third party deductions). 
The DWP’s impact assessment of the revised cap suggested that 88,000 households
(including 244,000 children) would be affected across Great Britain. This represents
64,000 more households and 161,000 more children than under the original cap.
Whereas the original cap mostly affected households living in areas with high rents
and those with larger families, the new cap was expected to further reduce the
benefits of those households and to spread the impact to areas with lower rents.
The revised cap has now been operating long enough to examine its actual impact.
Table 2.6.2 takes August 2015 and August 2018 as reference points to assess the
impact of the original and revised benefit caps – each leaving sufficient time for 
the change to ‘bed down’. Many more claimants were affected by the revised cap
across all regions of Great Britain in August 2018 compared to three years
previously, with numbers increasing by almost 150 per cent from 23,379 to 57,755.
In August 2015 in all regions, lone parents represented more than half of
Table 2.6.2 Households affected by benefit cap by region and country,
2015 and 2018 
Total …of which …per cent Total …of which …per cent
household single with of total household single with of total
nos. capped dependent nos. capped dependent
Aug 2015 children Aug 2018 children
London 10,377 7,002 67% 13,757 8,613 63%
South East 2,419 1,726 71% 7,252 5,858 81%
West Midlands 1,947 1,031 53% 6,675 4,835 72%
North West 1,684 1,023 61% 5,648 4,263 75%
East of England 1,539 1,034 67% 5,032 4,019 80%
South West 1,012 680 67% 3,197 2,533 79%
East Midlands 898 546 61% 3,125 2,419 77%
North East 647 367 57% 2,419 1,787 74%
Scotland 840 440 52% 3,137 2,069 66%
Wales 699 412 59% 2,873 2,198 77%
Total 23,379 15,054 64% 57,755 42,052 73%
Source: Author calculations created from DWP StatXplore data. 
Table 2.6.1 Original and revised benefit caps
Single Family
£ per annum £ per week £ per annum £ per week
Previous cap – April 2013 Great Britain 18,200 350 26,000 500
Current cap – November 2016 London 15,410 300 23,000 440
Rest of GB 13,400 260 20,000 380
Source: The Benefit Cap, House of Commons Library.
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households capped; across GB as a whole, they represented almost two-thirds (64
per cent) of those having their benefits restricted. Under the revised cap, the
representation of lone parents among the households capped rose above 60 per
cent in every region and to almost three-quarters (73 per cent) of total households
capped. In this respect the measure appears to be poorly targeted as lone parents
are the group least likely to be able to avoid the cap by moving into work or
working more hours, because of caring commitments.1
Of the total of those capped, the distribution in terms of amount capped per
month is shown in Figure 2.6.1 (for the whole of Great Britain, at the same two
dates). Under both the 2013 and 2016 caps, the greatest numbers are found in the
category showing losses up to £25 per month. By 2018 the numbers in each
category had increased with the greatest proportionate increase being in the
category showing losses of £75-100 per month. Given that a high percentage are
lone-parent households least able to avoid the cap, most of those affected will
have difficulty in making up such large losses.
The benefit cap was introduced in Northern Ireland later than in the rest of the UK
– on 31 May 2016. Although the same caps are used, in November 2016 the
Northern Ireland Executive introduced a ‘supplementary payment’ to go to
claimants with children until 31 March 2020, to protect children’s welfare and
avoid the disruption that seeking cheaper accommodation might cause. 
Universal credit
Although greatly delayed, the roll-out of universal credit reached a landmark point
in December 2018 when the ‘full digital service’ reached every postcode area in the
UK. This means that all new claimants, other than those with a severe disability,
must now claim UC rather than any one of the six legacy benefits that it is
replacing. This contrasts with the situation that prevailed up until April 2016 when
new claims for UC were mostly limited to single people and couples (often with
no housing costs) in ‘gateway’ areas, which were not fully digitalised
Overall, the numbers of households claiming universal credit across GB have
almost doubled from 575,763 in August 2017 to 1,003,384 by August 2018. 
Table 2.6.3 Numbers of households claiming universal credit 
Country August 2017 August 2018
All claims With housing costs All claims With housing costs
England 471,476 231,274 853,680 496,174
Wales 23,275 7,615 47,564 24,898
Scotland 55,798 26,494 102,139 61,640
Total 575,763 265,442 1,003,384 582,859
Source: DWP Stat-Xplore. Total includes cases of unknown origin or housing cost status.
The DWP anticipates that the pilot phase of transferring claimants currently in
receipt of legacy benefits (‘managed migration’) will start in July 2019, with the
full process running from early 2020. The DWP are employing a ‘test and learn’
strategy with universal credit and feel this approach justifies the repeated delays.
The government is committed to ensuring that anyone who moves into UC as a
Figure 2.6.1 Numbers of claimants capped by amount per month,
2015 and 2018
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result of managed migration will not lose out in cash terms. Transitional
protection is promised to eligible claimants, to safeguard their existing benefit
entitlement until their circumstances change. Following examples of acute
hardship caused by the new system and fearing a rebellion from Conservative
backbenchers, Amber Rudd, the current work and pensions secretary, promised
that managed migration proper would not start until after an evaluation of the
pilot phase. During this phase, no more than 10,000 households will transfer 
from existing benefits to UC, to test the adequacy of the process. Even so, the
government still expects full roll-out to be achieved by 2023. 
There has been a succession of problems reported by those claiming UC such 
as the long waiting time, having to repay any advance payment of benefit and
higher ‘third party deductions’ (TPDs) which may be taken from a claimant’s
benefits in order to repay debts, such as rent, utilities or council tax arrears 
(see box). 
However, there have been some recent concessions. A seven-day period between
the claim being made and eligibility commencing was abolished in February
2018. Nonetheless, universal credit is still paid monthly in arrears, and new
claimants are advised that they should expect to wait 5-6 weeks before they
receive any money. Advance payments are intended to help during this period.
The government increased the advance from 50 per cent of estimated entitlement
to 100 per cent in January 2018, with claimants able to receive advance payments
within five days of applying. Recovery periods for the advance (as it is paid as an
interest-free loan) have been increased from six to 12 months and from October
2021 this will be extended to 16 months. A further concession was signalled in
January 2019 when some piloting of more frequent payments was announced. 
The government has also increased the amount that can be earned while
claiming UC (the work allowance) before being tapered away, now set at 63p in
the pound since April 2017. The work allowance is rising from £2,376 for
claimants in receipt of the housing costs element (the UC equivalent of housing
benefit) to £3,444 from April 2019. However, work allowances were removed
altogether for non-disabled claimants and those without children in April 2016.
The Treasury estimates the cost of raising the work allowance as rising from £545
million in 2019/20 to £1.7 billion in 2023/24, and it is expected to benefit 2.4
million households, on average by £630 per year.
As universal credit was rolled out, temporary accommodation (TA) was initially
covered by UC housing costs element for private renters which meant that
assistance was capped by the LHA rates. However, TA’s short-term nature along
with its often higher costs meant that arrears were inevitable and unsustainable,
both for provider and tenant. In response, the government brought TA back
under housing benefit legislation, by extending the end date of HB when a
claimant migrates to UC. This came into force in April 2018 but has not resolved
the longer-term arrangements for paying for TA.
Another key concern about UC compared to housing benefit was the payment of
the housing costs element to the tenant, other than in exceptional circumstances
(in England and Wales). From December 2017 the government made it easier to
Third party deductions (TPDs)
Under legacy benefits a third party deduction rate is permitted that is equivalent to five per
cent of the personal allowance of a single claimant aged 25 or over plus any ineligible
charges (fuel, water, etc.), and a claimant’s consent is required should the amount exceed 
25 per cent.
Under UC, the same five per cent rate applies per deduction, but for rent arrears may rise to
between ten and 20 per cent of the standard allowance. If the maximum number of TPDs is
applied, then up to 40 per cent of the standard allowance may be deducted. In a concession,
this will be reduced to 30 per cent from October 2019 (unless the claimant’s interests would
merit a greater proportion). 
However, with other deductions (such as repayment of advance payments) also being taken
from benefits, the minimum that a claimant can be left with is just one penny per month 
to ensure that they have access to passported entitlements such as free prescriptions 
(in England).
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have the housing costs element paid directly to the landlord (both social and
private landlords), using so-called ‘managed payments’. Paying rent to the landlord
may be thought necessary where the tenant displays significant ‘vulnerabilities’
such as addictions or difficulties in budgeting. It can also be requested by the
landlord where tenants have certain levels of arrears. Tenants granted managed
payments are offered personal budgeting support. The presumption is that most
will be helped towards making their rent payments themselves.
In January 2018, the government extended the simplification measures to private
landlords so that they are no longer required to gain explicit consent from the
tenant before requesting a managed payment. Nonetheless, in 2018, whilst 33 per
cent of social tenants in receipt of UC had their rent support paid directly to their
landlord, this was the case for just five per cent of private tenants. This prompted
the secretary of state in January 2019 to signal that she would further facilitate
direct payments to landlords. Without making clear what changes will be made,
she promised to ‘...consider what else to do, because I am determined to help keep
people in their homes’.2
A longitudinal survey commissioned by the DWP and published in June 2018
gives an interesting insight into how claimants are coping with UC. Even though a
high number of claimants felt confident in managing their money, including their
housing costs, over one-third had experienced difficulties with housing cost
payments over both stages of the survey (just over 1,000 claimants were surveyed
and interviewed in each stage). Half had experienced difficulties with all bills and
housing costs.3 This is echoed in reports from local authority landlords that where
UC has been rolled out rent arrears have grown exponentially.4
The Scotland Act 2016 enabled the Scottish Government to vary the frequency of
UC payments. Across Scotland claimants can choose to be paid either monthly or
twice-monthly, and to have their housing costs paid direct to their landlord,
although many opt not to because it means their first payment is only half their
award. The Northern Ireland Executive has used its powers to vary the way in
which UC can be paid: twice-monthly payments will be available to all
households as the default, with monthly payments available on request. 
Split payments (paid into separate bank accounts) will be possible between
different people within the same household. Direct (managed) payments to
landlords for rent are available to all claimants by default, with a direct payment
to the household only available on request to those who satisfy certain criteria. 
Support for mortgage interest (SMI)
Historically, homeowners have been entitled to financial support to meet their
mortgage interest costs through the main means-tested social security benefit such
as supplementary benefit, income support, etc. During the housing market
recession of the early 1990s, when homeowners were confronted by the ‘perfect
storm’ of rapidly rising interest rates, falling house prices and rising
unemployment, and in a period when many households had high loan-to-value
mortgages, claims for what is known as support for mortgage interest (SMI)
soared. In its aftermath, the government sought to shift responsibility for payment
risk onto borrowers themselves. The Sustainable Home Ownership initiative aimed
to increase take-up of mortgage-payment protection insurance to more than half
of all borrowers, whilst a waiting period of 39 weeks was introduced for working-
age SMI claimants (those in receipt of pension credit had no waiting period.) This
system was intended to provide private cover for payment difficulties in the
expectation that these would be relatively short-term. Coverage peaked at around
47 per cent of first-time buyers and 36 per cent of all new borrowers, but with
fewer than one-quarter of all mortgages covered.5 Thereafter coverage fell away due
to bad publicity for the products on offer and the Office for Fair Trading’s decision
to investigate all payment protection policies.
But even had the coverage been wider, it seems unlikely that the government could
have avoided intervention when confronted with the kind of systemic shock
represented by the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008. It immediately reduced
the waiting time for SMI from 39 to 13 weeks, and doubled the mortgage ceiling
to £200,000 for working-age applicants (it remained at £100,000 for those on
pension credit). At this juncture also, the standard interest rate was frozen at 6.08
per cent. Since 2015, the waiting period has increased again to its pre-GFC 39
weeks and the amount of interest that could be paid was reduced to 3.63 per cent
then eventually to 2.61 per cent in June 2017. 
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The number of claims peaked in 2009/10 at 235,000, and declined to 136,000 in
2015/16. The cost of SMI peaked at £536 million in 2009/10 and fell to £280
million in 2015/16.6 In 2017/18 the DWP reported that of the estimated 108,000
who may be eligible for SMI, 90,000 were actually claiming it at a cost of £156
million.7 The scale of assistance required post-GFC was lower than in the 1990s,
when claims peaked at 550,000 (in 1993) and costs at over £1 billion (1995). This
may be attributed to fewer highly levered borrowers going into the crisis (the
pricing out of would-be first-time buyers was already well-established by 2008),
the aggressive reduction in interest rates by the Bank of England, and the adoption
of quantitative easing which was intended to support asset prices. Possessions were
further limited by the requirement from the courts for lenders to exercise greater
forbearance than in the past. 
A successful emergency operation, however, did not resolve what the DWP had
long-regarded as being an unsatisfactory system, with the tail of long-term, or even
perpetual, claims looking more like a form of support for asset acquisition rather
than income support. The government still considered the scheme was
‘unsustainable’; while wanting to mitigate the risk of repossession it also wanted
better value for the taxpayer. Thus, since April 2018, SMI is no longer a benefit and
has been replaced by what are really loans for mortgage interest (LMI) although
DWP persist in retaining the name SMI. The new scheme is estimated to achieve a
net saving of £255 million by 2020/21.8
Existing recipients were invited to make an application for a loan by Serco, who
operate the LMI loan on the DWP’s behalf. Loans are charged interest daily, linked
to the cost of gilts (forecast at 1.5 per cent for 2018/19). The loan is repaid on the
sale or transfer of the home or when the recipient can afford to make a full or
partial repayment once they move into work. There are also significant differences
if eligible through legacy benefits or universal credit, the main being the ‘zero
earning rule’ (not including shared-ownership claimants) which means that if the
claimant takes any work they will have to go through the 39 weeks waiting period
again if they wish to re-claim. 
In November 2018, the DWP estimated that 102,000 households may be eligible
for LMI, but only 17,000 had signed a loan agreement with a further 5,000
agreeing to the loan in principle. Take-up is worryingly low but at present it is too
early to assess if this will result in more repossessions (see below). Due to low
take-up the government is allowing those who change their mind to have an
eligible loan backdated to 6 April 2018. 
Figure 2.6.2 shows the downward trajectory of homeowners’ mortgage arrears in
recent years. Arrears in excess of 2.5 per cent of outstanding balance declined by
more than a fifth in the three years to Q3 2018 at which point there were 77,600
households in this position. This represents less than one per cent of the nine
million homeowner mortgages outstanding. Whilst the number of mortgages 
2.5-5 per cent in arrears declined by one-third there has been a small (six per cent)
upward drift in the number of mortgages with arrears of more than ten per cent,
over the same period. 
Figure 2.6.3 records the number of homeowner possessions, also over the period
2015-18. The tendency has also been downwards although there have been some
rises (especially in Q3 2017). However, the possession levels in Q2 and Q3 2018
were the lowest of the 13 quarters in the period, and represent an annual rate of
about 0.05 per cent of the total number of homeowner mortgages. 
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Figure 2.6.2 Mortgage arrears 2015-18
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The current situation appears benign. Interest rates are low and not expected to
rise rapidly. Macro- and micro-prudential regulations introduced after the GFC
clearly limit risks. Although numbers of impaired-credit mortgages rose in 2018
they represent only 0.6 per cent of gross lending in Q3 2018, whereas they were
consistently above three per cent throughout 2007.9 Very little lending takes place
with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios in excess of 95 per cent. Although LTVs in excess of
90 per cent have recovered somewhat they remain at only one-third of the 2007
level (see Figure 2.6.4). 
However, experience after the 1987 and 2007 crises shows how quickly the
situation can change. There is every reason to concur with the conclusion of
Challenges for our Home Ownership Safety Net that ‘A mortgage specific safety net
system has thus proved necessary here in the past and is likely to be required in
the future’.10 It might be further cautioned that the scope for the government’s
response to a shock is more limited now compared to 2007, because the ability to
cut interest rates is more limited, an extensive quantitative easing programme has
already taken place and has yet to be reversed, and the fiscal deficit built up after
2008 has only just peaked. 
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